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Newspapers and journals have been crowded with stories of mergers, acquisitions and 
company restructurings that have taken place in the wake of the introduction of the 
Euro. Europhoria is running high and it seems that the time has come to prepare for a 
return to the economic and business reality. While in the UK the debate on the sense and 
the non-sense of joining the Euro is still in full swing, on the continent the question to 
ask has now changed from 'do we want a single currency' and 'how do we introduce it' to 
'what should we do with the single currency' and 'what does it mean for our company 
strategy, really'. 
According to a recent report, 80% of financial and retail companies believe that there will 
be some effect of the Euro on their business1• Most of this type of studies have focused 
on the technical aspects of the Euro : have the systems been adapted to the single 
currency) Can the accounting department handle billing in Euro in stead of marks or 
francs) Can financials be managed in Euros? On various occasions, researchers have also 
assessed the degree of readiness of companies, institutions and governments to these 
technical aspects. During a recent seminar, a survey revealed that while 77% of the 
organizations surveyed for this study claimed to understand fully the implications of the 
Euro introduction2, one should still wonder what these implications will be, particularly 
those of a strategic nature. 
These have been less studied so far, eclipsed by all the concerns about the operational 
change-over. What does the Euro mean for corporate strategies, and particularly for the 
European strategies and organizations of multinational corporations? Is the Euro 
strategic at all- if so, in what way? Does it open new business opportunities? Or has it 
just been an operational nuisance? These questions form the subject of this paper, where 
we will focus on the strategic implications of the Euro for non-financial companies. We 
will not directly interfere with the macro-economic, or political debate (or only to the 
extent that policy should take account of the impact or implications of the Euro on 
strategic business issues3) . 
• Professor of Strategy and International Management, KULeuven (Belgium) and INSEAD (France), 
paul. verdin@econ.kuleuven.ac.be 
.. Partner in Executive Learning Partnership (Netherlands), nick.van.heck@skynet.be 
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I Spikes Cavell and Co, "Eurocrash: Fear and Uncertainty in Euroland", with Peoplesoft, and 
Deloitte and Touche, November 1998 
2 PeopleSoft - Deloitte Consulting Survey results, presented during the 'Shared Services Executive 
Forum', December 111998, Brussels. 
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We address these questions against the background of our year-long research in a wide 
range of industries and companies on the development of European strategies and 
. . 4 
orgaruzatlons . 
First, evidence will be shown on how companies regard the Euro as strategic. Then, we 
will turn to the underlying strategic questions with special focus on what the Euro could 
mean for market and price convergence. We will discuss the potential for new value 
creation in an integrated European market. Finally we will argue that while the 
introduction of the Euro as such is not strategic from a corporate perspective, companies 
can make the Euro strategic, as a catalyst, in the context of the management of the 
overall European strategy process. We will warn against overextended expectations and 
the 'anti-strategic' potential of the Euro. 
Is the Euro strategic? 
While the operational impact of the Euro should not be underestimated (and we share 
the concern of recent reports, as mentioned above), the research question that lies 
underneath this paper is what the Euro means for corporate strategies in the European 
context. 
Let us first look at what managers themselves say about this: 
• A survey done by the European Accountants Federation (FEE)5 concluded that only 
one out of two companies saw strategic implications of the Euro for their company. 
Strategy was only 10th on the list of priorities for adaptation to the Euro, far beyond 
'accounting and financial reporting' (which was cited by 84% of the people surveyed 
as strongly affected by the Euro). 
• Another recent report by the Economist Intelligence Unit6 listed EMU only 5th on 
the list of driving forces behind European shared services restructuring (an important 
component for the development of pan-European strategies) and was cited by only 
20% of the respondents. 
• Yet another survey shows that the respondents do not view the Euro as a positive 
business opportunity7. 
«Most companies 
consider the Euro 
as a technical and 
operational issue in 
the first place. » 
All these findings point in the same direction and are in 
line with our own, more casual, impressions out of 
exchanges with management teams in various industries. 
Most companies tend to consider the Euro as a technical 
and operational issue in the first place, and will hence 
devote their attention and effort to these aspects, rather 
than to the strategic implications. 
One may find this surprising, or even alarming. Some observers indeed have pleaded for 
a broader understanding of the Euro implications. The CFO of one important European 
multinational complained about the isolation of the financial department in his company 
4 Based on about two dozen of in-depth and year-long industry and company case studies (most of 
which have been published), complemented with as many mini-cases and presentations or articles for 
international academic and practitioners audience (see references in back) 
5 See Financieel Economische Tijd, Sept 4, 1998, or on http://www.tijd.be under heading 'ondernemen' 
6 Krempel, M. "Shared Services: a New Business Architecturefor Europe", Research report, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, September 1998. 
7 Spikes Cavell and Co, "Eurocrash : Fear and Uncertainty in Euroland", with Peoplesoft, and 
Deloitte and Touche, November 1998. 
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when preparing for the post-Euro eras. He and some of his colleague-managers are 
warning that the Euro effects are not just felt in the finance department offices alone, but 
that the whole company should be involved. 
Let us take a step back from this evidence and try to think through the strategic 
implications of the Euro introduction. In order to do this, we should ask ourselves how 
the conversion to a Single Currency changes the key strategic questions (or answers to 
these questions) that companies are facing up to : 
1. How does the nature and structure of our industry look like and what forces are at 
hand in changing it? Particularly, what pressures for market convergence do we see in 
our industry and competitive landscape in the European scene? 
2. What new opportunities for (or threats to) value creation and value capturing will 
arise at the company level? Particularly, what opportunities for increased efficiency 
and cross border segmentation can be expected in 'Euroland'? 
3. How will the basis and sustainability of our competitive advantage vis-a-vis our 
competitors change in the Eurozone? What is the differential effect of the Euro on 
different types of players in our industry? 
When thinking through these strategic questions and the impact of the Euro, we arrive at 
the conclusions that the effects of the Euro are not necessarily as overwhelming as some 
would like to make us believe, nor are they as obvious or general as simplistic slogans in 
the current debate seem to imply. We will now elaborate on the reasons underlying this 
conclusion. 
The Euro and market convergence 
In industry after industry, the million dollar question on the European scene has been 
since years : how much convergence do you have, do you want and will you get in your 
business in the future? On the one hand companies feel the pressure to internationalize 
and/ or integrate their international operations, because of converging customer 
preferences and potential cost advantages (typically economies of scale) or opportunities 
to follow their customers internationally and serve them in international networks (the so 
called network benefits)9. On the other hand, numerous forces slow down market 
convergence and keep companies from reaping the above mentioned benefits. Customer 
preferences remain different because of social and cultural discrepancies in Europe, the 
cost advantages are lower because of structural barriers Oegal, tax, social, language, etc) 
and the network benefits minimized. A constant analysis of the 
globalization/Europeanization and localization pressures in your industry and a 
continuous monitoring of the market evolutions are then necessary. 
In the analysis of these pressures, it is important to go to the lowest level of detail 
possible: it might be that different functions or tasks in your company will be differently 
affected by the above mentioned global-local forces. In addition, it is key to take a 
dynamic view on these forces affecting your industry and company: the globalization 
pressures are certainly changing, while the barriers or localization drivers might fall. As a 
consequence of these continuous evolutions, timing issues playa key role. 
8 CFO Europe, October-November 1998. 
9 This analytical framework is discussed in greater detail in P. Verdin and N. Van Heck, Managing 
International Strategy: A European Perspective, forthcoming. 
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In our research, we have observed many cases of expecting 'too much integration, too 
soon' : companies acted as if their business was global or European, but in fact the bulk 
of the business remained local in nature. For example: Federal Express was an early 
mover in the European package delivery business, delivering excellent services at 
competitive prices, only to realize that the parcel delivery business in Europe was mainly 
focused on intra-national delivery services, and was hence not sufficient to maintain the 
service level and infrastructure of Fedex. After a couple of years of significant losses, 
Fedex in early 1993 decided to retract and focus their European operations on the 
transatlantic services only. 
The opposite is dangerous as well : too little integration too late might be unsustainable 
vis-a-vis the competitors. The Dutch truck manufacturer, DAFlo, had trouble facing up 
to competitors that had moved further in the internationalization and integration of their 
European activities. Hence it was not able to survive as the successful independent 
players it once was and went bankrupt in 1993. The restarted company, the New DAF, 
was sold to Paccar of the US in 1996. 
It is all about monitoring the business, understanding what is going on, and adapting the 
international strategy accordingly. It is not because your business is today mainly local by 
nature, that it will still be in five years time. On the other hand, it is not because some of 
the globalization barriers fall or are believed to fall, that all of a sudden your business is 
global or European. There might still be considerable localization drivers. 
Only a continuous in-depth analysis of the industry and market your company is 
operating in, at the right level of detail, will tell you how the nature of the business and 
competition is changing, and how fast it is going. This should allow you to set reasonable 
expectations in terms of the benefits reap able of internationalization and/or integration. 
Our research has allowed us to summarize the 5 key aspects for a good industry and 
market analysis: 
Table 1 : How to analyze your business: 
Here are 5 key aspects for a good industry and market analysis 
1. Be biased: question standardization and pan-European integration. 
2. Distinguish between level of convergence and rate of change 
3. Timing is key: avoid 'too much too soon' or 'too little too late' 
4. You need systems for continuous monitoring and scanning the environment 
5. Once you can see the benefits, it might be too late: you need a 'market vision' as well 
10 Verdin P. , de Haan, F., Ricart, J. and Thomassen, H., The European Truck Industry in 1990: 
Preparing for the Post-1992 Era and DAF in 1991 : Preparing for the Post-1992 Era, case studies, 
IESE, 1991 in Ghoshal, S. ; Mintzberg, H. and Quinn, J.B. : "The Strategy Process" , European Edition, 
Prentice Hall, 2nd edition 1995, p 137-168. 
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The question is how much weight the Euro is putting into this global-local balance in 
your industry and company. Although one should be careful generalizing, we tend to 
conclude from our research that this effect is minimal in most industries and markets. 
We fear that the expectations of the Euro effect on the market convergence might be 
overextended. 
Overextended expectations 
Many people seem to be expecting 'the world' of January 1999. It looks or sounds 'deja-
vu or -entendu' : the Euro 1999 hype resembles to the overextended expectations of a 
'really unified market' in the post-1992 Europe. 
The European Internal Market program aimed to eliminate some of the barriers for 
market convergence in Europe : European companies had often been found lagging 
behind their worldwide competitors in terms of competitiveness and profitabilityll. A 
Conference Board Europe12 study confirmed that a significant amount of restructuring 
has taken place within Europe in the wake of the European Unified Market, believing 
that Europe 1992 would finally integrate the European market. 
Having followed several companies and industries operating in Europe closely for years 
now, we have also observed many disappointments within companies with regard to the 
results obtained from their corporate restructuring and strategy/organization integration 
projects. 
One reason for this disappointment we think might be the conclusion that the European 
market was not really as uniform as anticipated, and hence less or limited benefits of 
integration could actually be reaped. 
• Although 1992 implied really important regulatory and policy measures to open up 
the markets in many sectors, with important de-regulation, liberalization, and 
opening up of borders; the effects of 1992 were generally overestimated. Several 
sources and studies came to the conclusion that the 1992 Delors Program did not 
change the (Euro)world the way it was expected: 
o A study from the European Commission indicated that although the expectations 
were that over one third of the economic benefits of the 1992 program would 
come from increased economies of scale, it has been argued that the amount of 
scale economies was lower than expected. The study suggested that with 
hindsight (much) less of these scale benefits actually have materialized13 • 
o A Eurostat business survey supported these findings by indicating that 53% of 
the companies surveyed admitted that the 1992 Internal Market program had no 
affect on their business. 
But if the impact of the Internal Market program was limited, we argue that the 
effect of the Euro on market convergence may turn out to be even more limited. After 
11 See European Commission, "Situation Financiere des Entreprises Industrielles (Financial Situation 
of Industrial Companies), Economie Europeenne, Supplement A", April 1996. 
12 Bleackley, M. and Williamson, P. , "The Nature and Extent of Corporate Restructuring with 
Europe's Single Market: Cutting through the Hype", European Management Journal, vol 15 (1997), 
nO 5 : 484-497. 
13 Commission of the European Communities, "Study on the Extent of Realisation of Economies of 
Scale due to the Internal Market Programme", 1996. 
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all, for most industries (except maybe financial services sector and directly related 
industries) it is in the first place a purely technical and 'accounting' change with 
implied IT and processing issues. 
• The impression we have is that 1992 was not only overestimated in terms of the total 
effect, but at least in terms of the timing. One executive from a European company 
confirmed: 
'The question is when Europe 1992 will come. In some industries, Europe 1992 already 
happened in the mid 1980s, in some other it will onlY happen in the next century. As SIIch 
Europe 1992 has onlY a symbolic value. " 
Market convergence has not started with the Euro (which makes that companies 
should have thought about this and acted on it long before the Euro was 
implemented), nor will it end with the Euro (Europe is not one market, a lot of 
barriers, some of them more important than the currency, remain). This is a much 
larger problem. Karel Van Miert, European Commissioner observed recently: 
"Forry years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the European Community for Coal 
and Steel, we are on the verge of a real integrated European Market - for coal and steel. I~" 
"How long will it be 
before more Fiats 
are seen driving on 
the French roads 
than Renaults?" 
The Euro is not going to make the European market 
integrated overnight! How long will it be before more 
Fiats are seen driving on the French roads than Renaults, 
even though the car manufacturing business is considered 
to be one of the most global? Europe is not Europe yet, 
even after the Euro : the real integration is in fact a long 
way off. 
• For others the integration may never come : 
"On the one hand you have all the big dreams of the industry and on the other hand you baz'e 
the dreams of the European authorities - and in reality you have the local situation. )) Eric 
Van Keerbergen, Coditel. 
'We gliblY talk about a European system, but in reality we are talking about 15 sovereign 
states", Bryan Allworthy, Merril Lynch. 
"The more 
important the 
January date seems, 
the more 
operational the Euro 
conversion is." 
• By creating attention to and hype around the January 1 
(1999 or 2002) date, one contributes to a dangerous kind 
of end-game fallacy15. Some observers or analysts are 
speaking as if all bets are off on January 1 1999 or 2002. 
Take positions before that date, and expect to see on that 
date or soon after it, who is the winner and who is the 
loser! This 'casino' view of business is not productive and 
deviates management from real strategic issues. The more 
important the January date seems, the more operational 
the Euro conversion is. 
What is key is that companies realize that this tendency towards homogenization is an 
ongoing process that they should monitor and adapt their approaches accordingly. Even 
more complex and difficult are the organizational process issues developed below. 
14 Address by Karel Van Miert, European Commissioner, at the opening of the MBA program, 
KULeuven, September 1997. 
15 This point has received only sporadic attention, see e.g. Financial Times, September 4 1997 : 
"Merger Gambit". 
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There are plenty of other forces at work in industries, on cost and market side : 
globalization of economy, evolutions in technology (a manager once said to us that he 
expects more price convergence from the internet, than from the Euro) , Y2K, 
deregulation, regionalization of economies (EU, Mercosur, ASEAN, etc.), demographic 
evolutions, to name only the most important ones. And all of these affect a broad range 
of industries and companies, and indeed change 'the name of the game'. The effects of 
these forces on the degree of market convergence and the global-local balance in 
industries are real. 
The Euro is a very small piece of this constantly changing puzzle. The net effect of 
introducing a single currency, amidst all these other evolutions, should therefore not be 
overestimated for non-financial companies'6. A similar conclusion was drawn from a 
recent analysis of the expected Euro effect on different industries 17. 
The Euro and price convergence 
An often heard claim is that the Euro will speed up price convergence across Europe, 
sometimes called 'a key strategic implication' of the Euro. In the above mentioned survey 
of FEE, marketing and particularly pricing are number two on the list of focal areas for 
Euro adaptation (no surprise of course, since prices will have to be expressed in Euro in 
stead of local currency!) But what is in our interest is to know if this makes the Euro 
strategic: will the Euro on its own lead to increased price convergence across borders? 
The expectation (or fear for some) lives in numerous multinational corporations that the 
price differences within the Euroland will gradually disappear, and worse still, that prices 
will converge to the lowest level (the so-called pricing time bomb'8). 
Although the Euro-pricing debate has been going on for years now (e.g. in the context of 
the 1992 program), the question now is if we reallY should get homogeneous prices all 
over Europe because of the Euro? Let us think through what the Euro means for the 
price differences in different products and services. 
16 Even for the financial sector, voices have been heard that the Euro effect is there more limited than 
some would like us to believe, like in Praet, P. and Wibaut, S. "The Euro : What a Difference a Day 
Makes", paper for 21S[ Colloquium of Societe Europeene de Recherches Financieres, Frankfurt, Oct 
1998. 
17 Wall Street Journal Europe, January 4 1999: "Advent ofEuro unlocks Competitive Forces across 
many Sectors". 
18 A key contribution on this topic has been made by Simon, H. and Kucher, E. : "The European 
Pricing Time Bomb - and How to Cope with it ", in Haliburton, C. and Hiinerberg, R. (ed.), European 
Marketing: Readings and Cases, Wockingham : Addison Wesley, 1993,218-229. 
• Consumerproducts 
Let us look at a sample. 
Table 2 : Prices of selected goods and services (in dollars) 
Belgium France Germany 
1.5 liter bottle of Coca Cola 2.05 1.05 1.89 
Big Mac 2.86 3.08 2.67 
Liter of unleaded gasoline 0.93 1.03 0.87 
Dry-cleaned men's shirt 3.68 4.57 2.43 
Pair of Levi's 501 jeans 71.00 83.00 81.00 
Compaq Presario 2240 1,316.00 1,348.00 917.00 
One day rental car, Mercedes C 154.00 110.00 103.00 
One hour translation 89.00 104.00 78.00 
Source: Business Week, "Gaps the Euro may close", April 27, 1998. 
Why do we have these price differences? 
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Italy Spain 
1.65 1.14 
2.48 2.38 
0.94 0.73 
3.75 2.92 
69.00 70.00 
1,208.00 1,267.00 
253.00 113.00 
55.00 39.00 
o The demand for certain products is depending on local conditions, like e.g. 
weather conditions (Coca Cola) 
o The prices of certain products is heavily dependant on tax systems e.g. 
gasoline 
o Customer preferences might change significantly across countries, e.g. Big 
Mac and jeans trousers 
o Competition can allow for larger or smaller margins, e.g. computers. 
These price differences have been existing (and been significant, for some products) for 
years. Consumers have been aware of them and have accepted them without an Euro. 
Now let LIS see : how many of these gaps will really be closed simply because of the 
Euro) 
o Will the Euro change local conditions, like weather? 
o Will tax systems harmonize around Europe because of the Euro? 
o Will customer preferences be adapted? 
o Will competition change once the Euro is there? 
For years now customers have been able to buy a car in other European countries, but 
still, the Fiat Marea SX 1.6 liters sedan is priced ECU 16,692 (including taxes) in 
Belgium, and costs ECU 19,203 (tax incl.) in the Netherlands. Even for products where 
one would expect significant arbitrage and price sensitivity (for consumer durables, like 
cars), it looks grossly exaggerated to expect uniform Euro-prices from day one of the 
Euro calendar! It is hard to believe that the purchasing habits of Belgian or Dutch 
consumers will change, once they have an Euro. Research on this domain has indicated 
that the price differential will only be reduced or eliminated once the trade barriers, of 
which the importance is different from one industry to another, are really removedl9 . In 
addition, the EU exemptions for care distribution arrangements have nothing but 
sustained these price differences. 
19 Presentation by Frank Verboven on EMU, "Price Competition and Market Structure", during Centre 
for European Policy Studies Working Party, on Euro and Corporate Strategy, July 1998. 
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Let us take another example : one can buy toys from the same chain, like Bart Smit, in 
Antwerp (Belgium) and in Breda (Netherlands), only 40 kilometers away from each 
other. For quite some time, the toys have had dual pricing, one in guilders and one in 
BEF, of course only the BEF price has been valid in Belgium. The Belgian price is equal 
to the Dutch price multiplied by 20, although the exact exchange rate between Belgian 
Francs and Dutch Guilders has been 18.3x for years, only floating a couple of centimes 
(within the European Monetary System). Of course, when translating the Antwerp and 
the Breda price to Euros, the difference in price will become clearer, or will it? Either the 
prices will be equalized (which would be foolish for Bart Smit to do) or we will just have 
one price in each location (probably different from each other). The point is : customers 
have been able to compare the Bart Smit prices for years and they realize they could get 
the same toy cheaper in Breda. Should that mean that Bart Smit should decide to lower 
the Breda price (or even less likely increase the Antwerp price) as of January 1 1999 or 
2002, because it will all be in Euros? Will the Belgian customer from that date on be 
willing to travel to Breda to get the toy cheaper there? That sounds silly. To some extent, 
the price differences for consumer goods have sustained because of the transportation 
costs, even more when these costs are relatively high in comparison to the overall cost of 
this type of purchase. 
The assumption of price homogenization for consumer products grossly underestimates 
the sophistication of consumers and the existence of various differences across Europe 
beyond currency differences. 
The broader point is that there are many real reasons of economic and strategic nature 
why prices for the same goods differ from one place to another. It would be foolish to 
assume that these reasons will disappear because of a single currency. If anything, 
transparency may decrease as most consumers will not at all be used to the role of the 
Euro and dual pricing (with their own national currency) will continue for some time. 
"Transparency is only 
one tiny element 
responsible for 
existing price 
differences." 
• BusineJJ-to business products 
Transparency is only one tiny element responsible for 
existing price differences. The main reasons are the 
different cost and market structure and thus will not 
significantly change just because of the Euro. We can see 
this in the US market where despite the use of a single 
currency for years, price differentials still hold. 
For business-to-business marketing (where transportation costs are relatively less 
important), it would be false to expect professional buyers only to 'notice' the price 
differences across countries, after the Euro got introduced. Professional buyers have 
been sophisticated for years: those buyers probably got to a point where they understand 
how many of the price differentials are really due to the different currencies (and have 
consequently squeezed producers to eliminate these differences) and how many flexibility 
producers have for lowering prices within the economic rationale. Will the Euro for 
those buyers and producers make as much of a difference as some people make us 
believe? 
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Research conducted by the European Commission20 has confirmed that generally, the 
price dispersion in Europe has declined between 1985 and 1993. Potential causes of the 
price convergence in that time range was the increasing competition and globalization of 
the economy. The same research has indicated that this decline in price dispersion 
however has slowed between 1993 and 1996, notwithstanding the 1992 program and the 
high expectations that price convergence would be sped up, rather than slowed down. 
Various factors have been pinpointed in this report to explain the remaining price 
differences in 1996: structural factors (preferences, tastes, transportation costs), 
behavioral (market segmentation, product differentiation), policy reasons (regulation, 
taxation). Will the Euro have any effect on these factors? 
Of course, from a public policy standpoint, we could not agree more that if the Euro 
introduction will act as a catalyst or a stick to force other substantial changes in 
integration (tax, social, legal, etc.), the real underlying differences responsible for some of 
the cross-border price differences could start to disappear. But for this, we need to first 
get some of these substantial changes beyond 1992 or beyond what we have seen so far. 
In that sense, the Euro can act as a trigger or catalyst at the public policy level to push 
through other (more important?) regulatory measures (cf. The Euro as a catalyst at the 
corporate level, below). 
While the Single Currency might increase the transparency of the prices in Europe, it 
may make price differences less acceptable from a social and political point of view. 
Consumer organizations will undoubtedly increase the pressure on producers to 
eliminate 'unfair' price differentials, but we should realize that much of these differences 
are due to various factors, external to the Euro. Differences in transportation costs, 
different taxation, differences in competitive situation, different preferences, to name 
only a few, will remain having an impact on prices and their different levels, and they 
should. The risk is even there that the political pressure will force companies to 
uniformize prices beyond economic logic. 
"Even within a fully 
integrated market, 
regional price 
differentials will 
continue to exist." 
The conclusion from the European Commission research 
goes even further by saying that: "Even within a fully 
integrated market, regional price differentials will continue 
to exist.". This seems to make sense, but is often 
overlooked in the current debate. It is fair in that context 
to refer to the US example : they have been working with 
a single currency for years, and still considerable price 
differences exist, mostly for good (market-conform) 
reasons. 
Our argument implies that companies should not rush into price homogenization, 
because of a switch to the Euro. Companies that do so, might price sub-optimally and 
lose opportunities for price discrimination, and jeopardize their own profitability, in the 
extreme case (the 'too much, too soon' trap). If companies set homogeneous prices or 
will be forced to lower the price differentials, the danger is that they might even go 
against the economic rationale, which says that the price differences that are explained by 
economic relevant factors are justifiable and should therefore be maintained. 
20 Presentation by Adriaan Dierx, DGII, European Commission, "Market Integration and Price 
Convergence", during Centre for European Policy Studies Working Party on 'Euro and Corporate 
Strategy', July 1998. 
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The Euro as opportunity for new value creation 
Having said all this, is there no chance for the Euro to open new opportunities for value 
creation- The Euro may make company management better aware that market 
segmentation, and price discrimination along pure geographic dimensions are 
increasingly becoming obsolete. The underlying rationale for this evolution, a converging 
market, is however not depending on the introduction of a new currency. If the Euro 
speeds up this tendency, it is only because the increased transparency forced companies 
to do what they should do or should have been doing in any event. The Euro thus only 
acts as a catalyst in this process (see below). Price discrimination and market 
segmentation will continue to take place, but maybe less on purely geographic 
dimensions. It is however our expectation, that if that is the case, this change will not 
happen overnight. This type of convergence in one way and divergence in another will 
take a long time to be operational and effective. 
More importantly, it should not be forgotten that market integration (when and if it really 
becomes a reality) should not eliminate discrimination or segmentation (in prices e.g.), on 
the contrary, it might exactly unleash opportunities for more segmentation or 
discrimination rather than less -but on 'economic' relevant criteria, rather than (artificial?) 
geographic ones. The Euro can contribute to this development and this paper can be an 
illustration of how at least it helps fostering the debate about and hopefully also the 
insights into these underlying issues (again the Euro as catalyst). The Euro might hence 
have some strategic consequences because it makes companies aware of more rather less 
chances for customer responsiveness. 
"If the Euro is 
going to harmonize 
your strategy and 
pricing in 
particular, what 
have you been 
waiting for?" 
It is important to realize that market convergence (and as 
such maybe also the Euro), will have an effect on value 
creation opportunities (see second strategic question 
above), but then in the opposite direction than some 
people are trying to make us believe. Some companies 
seem to foolishly run into a 'one size fits all' strategy, 
because of the Euro. This is false: if the Euro is going to 
harmonize your strategy and pricing in particular, what 
have you been waiting for? It probably means that your 
pricing and strategy was previously sub-optimaL 
In addition, a standardized strategy misses the real message that market convergence 
allows for better segmentation rather than requires necessarily pure standardization. 
Market convergence will allow companies to (better) serve cross border customer 
segments, that could not economically be served before. We should prepare for more, 
not less complexity, because that is why a lot of value creation can take place. 
So is the Euro really strategic? 
We therefore warn against simplistic slogans and generalizations because they overlook 
the need for nuance and company specific answers. In principal, we can not answer the 
question whether the Euro is strategic, for your company. It requires a company specific 
answer to be formulated after a careful and detailed analysis of your industry and 
company. In this exercise, management should try to should look at the broader picture 
of changes in the European market forcing for more integration on the one hand and 
enabling close customer responsiveness on the other hand. 
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The Euro and market convergence might have a differential impact on companies in 
your industry: the Euro could mean different things for small companies than for larger 
companies, for European or non-European companies, established or newcomers. 
Nevertheless, we anticipate that for non-financial companies, chances are high that the 
Euro effect is negligible and is as such not going to make a significant difference on the 
strategy side. Except of course, if the Euro is properly used as a catalyst. 
The Euro as a catalyst 
Although the actual (positive) impact of EMU on corporate strategies seems greatly 
« Although we think 
the Euro is not 
strategic, it can be 
made so. » 
overdone to us, top management can use the Euro as a 
catalyst for discussing and speeding up or jumpstarting 
major cross border strategy and organizational integration 
that is long overdue. Integration is then taking place not 
because of the Euro. The Single Currency introduction is a 
catalyst to start (thinking about) the integration21 or to 
unlock the blocked integration process. Although we 
think the Euro is not strategic, it can be made so. 
The better way in our view to make the Euro 'strategic' is by using it as a catalyst for 
European strategy and organizational enhancement. 
• The introduction of the Euro can help to bring forward the strategic re-evaluation 
and discussion on how much integration and internationalization is required to be 
successful (and to raise the strategic questions mentioned above). The question how 
much European coverage or European strategy and organization is needed, has in 
our view barely changed because of the Euro. The Euro just helps to bring it up or 
revisit it. 
• Or it can be used as a trigger to push the internal integration process that has not 
really taken off so far or has got stuck along the way. For instance, the proactive 
companies have already started evaluating what organization 'learning by doing' they 
have got out of their Euro team experience. 
For excellent companies that have been managing their integration process well, the Euro 
should not make much of a difference22• They have started the debate long before the 
Euro and have managed the process of integration successfully. Along these lines, a 
Hewlett Packard manager stated about the Euro : "I find it too easy, so I wonder if I am 
doing something wrong. It is a no-brainer for US 23". This seems to make a lot of sense to 
us. 
For those companies however that have not thought about a European strategy or 
succeeded to make it happen, the Euro can be made strategic if it is used 
• To re-evaluate their overall strategic position, and to re-consider their (pan-) 
European strategy and organization in particular, 
• Or to get a long overdue or slowing integration process moving again. 
21 See also presentation Dr. Rainer Saezle, Nestle, Center for European Policy Studies Working Party 
on Euro and Corporate Strategy, July 1998. 
22 We have studied some in greater detail, like e.g. Procter and Gamble Europe, 3M Europe. 
23 Krempel, M. "Shared Services: a New Busilless Architecture/or Europe", Research report, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, September 1998. 
14 
Managing the process 
Using the Euro as an enabler is fine, as long as you know what you are doing and when it 
is part of a process that is properly managed at the highest level. Otherwise, management 
risks a 'the tail wagging the dog' syndrome, whereby it uses the Euro (or say Euro-
pricing) to get the bigger debate starting. It is important to manage the consequences of 
it properly. For instance, the financial services integration within part of Hewlett 
Packard Europe in the wake of the introduction of the Euro, was being considered an 
enabler within the company itself to move the integration process further24 and managed 
accordingly. 
Our research in various companies from different industries, has made us conclude that 
company integration is a long process which should be carefully managed. Even when 
the benefits of integration are conceptually rather obvious, we have observed many cases 
where the management failed to (fully) reap these benefits, because they mismanaged this 
process2S . The transition from a domestic to an international player, or from a multi-
national to a pan-European player, requires a lot of time and effort. The following quote 
confirms: 
"Feu) chose the 'small is beautiful' route, preferring to develop into large pan-European players. 
They grossly underestimated however the cost and time of reshaping the portfolio. All in all, it 
took them twice as long and the operation was consequently twice as expensive as they had 
anticipated." Bain and Company Newsletter, September 1995. 
We have observed companies that took more than 20 years26 to set-up an integrated 
strategy and organization, and have done so by a strong vision combined with persistent 
effort and a willingness to learn from trial and error. They finally succeeded because they 
realized how important it was to pay attention to the management of the process. They 
saw the complexity of making it happen : it was not just a matter of moving from 
situation A to situation B. This move from A to B changed intrinsically the way business 
was done and went to the heart of the business. 
This research has allowed us to draw some general conclusions in terms of key success 
factors in the management of this process. These elements have also been corroborated 
in recent research about the increasingly important area of shared services in Europe27• 
24 Presentation of HP senior manager at the 'Shared Services Executive Forum', December 11 1998, 
Brussels. 
25 Verdin, P., De Koning, A. and Williamson, P. W., "So you want to Integrate Europe: How to 
Manage the Process?", European Management Journal, vol 15 (1997), n° 5 : 252-265. 
26 Long as this may seems, it is still more optimistic than the estimate of the former CEO of Pirelli who 
said "Twenty, 30 or 50 years from now, European companies will be multinationals in the basic sense 
of the word." 
27 Krempel, M. "Shared Services: a New Business Architecture jar Europe", Research report, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, September 1998, p. 87-90. 
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Table 3 : How to manage the integration process: 
Here are 10 key aspects we have found to be of critical importance for success 
I. You need a shared vision and top commitment. 
2. Pace the integration process properly: go slow if: 
* you have the time and are prepared to experiment and learn 
* you have secured and shared a long-term vision and sustained commitment 
but do not expect too much too soon, build critical mass and do not get stuck in the middle! 
3. go quickly if: 
* the result is more urgent than the process (i.e. in externally imposed crisis) or the path has been 
cleared long beforehand (i.e. create internal crisis) 
* you are sure you do not want to go back to your starting point anyhow 
but be sure to include in the change all critical dimensions at once. 
4. Identify the integration dimension(s) crucial for long term success for the business or industry 
(these might change over time). 
5. Lead integration initiatives on many dimensions of the business to build spillovers and critical 
mass. 
6. Include initiatives with quantifiable and short term integration benefits. 
7. Build the required culture, support (including reward systems, etc.) for the integration to function. 
S. Involve and provide demonstrable benefit to the local management. 
9. Keep options open and maximize learning potential but be decisive and make clear choices when 
conflicts arise. 
10. The best vision is rooted in sound analysis : 
* adapt the integration to the appropriate degree of market convergence. 
* continuously ask: where is the economic benefit? And are we getting it? 
Source: P. Verdin et. aI., European Management Journal, July 1997 
It is not enough to tell people how strategic the Euro is, and then simply ignore the 
management of the integration process. A number of side conditions need to be in place. 
If the Euro is turned into a strategic project, it should also be conducted at the right level 
in the company organization. When the Euro is an excuse for re-thinking the business 
system and international approach and strategy, it should not be left in the hands of staff 
people, who happened to be responsible for the technical aspects of the Euro, only. We 
have seen a company that initially set-up a Euro-team (with staff people, including 
accounting, finance, etc.), but soon split it up in two sub-projects, dealing with the 
technical or the strategic aspects of the Euro. The strategic aspects were indeed 
important in the company, because the European strategy had not been thought over in-
depth and implemented (as) successfully (as possible) so far. But the problem was that 
the Euro-project team was supposed to lead this type of strategic re-evaluation of the 
business. If Euro is used as a catalyst to get the process going, top management should 
clearly take its responsibility and commit to and lead the integration and re-evaluation. 
The top management should make sure that: 
• The expectations are well managed and realistically formulated 
• The different trade-offs that will undoubtedly be required, are made. It is like Claude 
Mancel, Vice President Research and Development P&G Europe, witnessed with 
regard to the integration process: "It was the first time we had to make decisions that were 
good for all of Europe and bad for particular individual countries. " 
• The required resources are dedicated to make the integration happen 
• The process of integration is constantly monitored, energized and followed up. In 
our research, it has shown that top commitment and vision from the top on the 
market is really making a difference in the chances for success. 
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• A long term perspective is taken: a long term view in this type of exercises is another 
factor that often determines success or failure. Although it might be good to look for 
some short term benefits (so called 'early wins'), it is key to take the long term view. 
If one realizes that this type of integration projects has taken several years (up to 
even 20 years) in some companies, it should be clear that an overly narrow time 
frame can kill the project, unless the necessary conditions are in place to let the 
shock-therapy work. Often, this type of 'big bang' approach is only possible when 
the pressure on the market has become untenable. Even in this scenario, it has 
proven that although the majority of the project can be finished in a very short time 
period, the longer term follow-up on the company position in the market remains 
key. In our research it has shown that the pace of the integration process influences 
its chances for success (either shock therapy or slow and steady). 
Effectiveness 
Shock 
T erapy 
Stuck in 
the 
middle 
Figure 1 
Slow & Steady 
Time 
"Shock Therapy" vs. "Slow and Steady" 
Careful so the Euro does not become anti-strategic 
Companies should constantly think about (and rethink) their international position, 
strategy and organization. The Euro can serve as a trigger to do this or as a way to get 
things moving in the company. Let us warn however for some possible dangers: 
• The Euro can distract from thinking about international strategy. In that case, the 
Euro is not only not strategic but even anti-strategic. Some companies are too busy 
getting their systems adapted to the Euro, and are focusing time and resources on 
getting ready for the technical aspects of the Euro conversion. Even to the extent 
that they overlook the real strategic issues in their business. 
o The shared services survey confirms that the opportunity costs of the resources 
dedicated to Euro conversion are not negligible: "Frequently, because of the 
immense resources needed for these implementations, companies have been 
unable to pursue other strategic growth initiatives"28. The concern grows that the 
Euro keeps some companies away from the real strategic questions and 
management challenges, and other real new business opportunities. 
28 Krempel, M. "Shared Services: a New Business Architecture for Europe", Research report, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, September 1998, p. 78. 
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o The estimated cost of the Euro conversion in the insurance industry for example 
accounts for £5 billion according to the Financial Times29 • This cost is for most 
industries a big one time write-off against which the benefits are only small, 
unsure and spread out in the future. 
o A study of Deloitte and Touche on the impact of the Euro on the retail sector30 
confirmed that there will be a gap in timing between the actual costs (short term 
and high) and the benefits Oong term and believed to be outweighed by the 
substantial costs). Can you imagine what would happen if companies dedicated 
this kind of resources to a strategic re-evaluation and process management in 
their business? 
• The danger of using the Euro to get 'things going' is that it overly emphasizes 
January 1999 or 2002 date and focuses systematically on the E-day as the final 
deadline. As mentioned before, the real strategic question about the degree of 
market convergence will not become relevant or irrelevant once the Euro is there, 
on the contrary. If companies only have eye for the short term questions (focused 
on the Euro), they might lose sight on what is really important: a long term view on 
how the industry and company position is evolving as we have explained above. If 
the Euro prevents companies from taking this long term perspective, the whole exercise 
might turn out to be anti-strategic. 
«If a certain 
acquisition or 
merger did not 
make sense 
before we had 
the Euro, why 
would it then all 
of a sudden be 
justified because 
of a new 
currency? » 
Conclusion 
• Another danger are unwarranted mergers and acquisitions and other 
restructurings. The expectations of the Euro are high and many 
deals, mergers and acquisitions, and restructuring are done in 
anticipation of EMU, as if the Euro is all of a sudden going to 
change the way business is done in their industry and 
customers buy. Embarking on integration projects because of 
the Euro, one should realize that 1999 is most likely not going 
to shake up the fundamentals and economics of their 
industry. Except possibly as a self fulfilling prophecy : if all 
players believe that the Euro is going to change their business 
and the competitive game, and start acting according to it, you 
indeed get a different industry structure and competitive game 
at the end of the day. But sooner or later, we have to come 
back to reality: if a certain acquisition or merger did not make 
sense before we had the Euro, why would it then all of 
sudden be justified because of a new currency? 
Convergence is certainly taking place in the European market, but it seems to take much 
longer than anticipated. That is because differences across borders and barriers for 
integration are far more complex than those resulting from different currencies. 
Managing the complex strategic and organizational challenges implied are much more 
time consuming. This is not to say that market convergence should be slowed down or 
that companies should give up integrating their strategies. On the contrary, it only pleads 
for realism in managing the process and the expected outcomes. We should definitely 
29 See article Financial Times, March 25 1998 : "Uninsured for Euro's survival". 
30 Deloitte and Touche, Euro : Costs and Retail Changeover Challenge, November 1997. 
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continue the road we have entered, and any excuses for pushing the market convergence 
and company integration, like the Euro, are of course welcome. 
"If the Euro really 
makes such a big 
difference for 
you, chances are 
that your are (or 
should be) in 
trouble anyway!" 
Intrinsically, the impact of the Euro on strategies 
however, looks limited. Let us state this a bit more 
provocatively : if the Euro really makes such a big 
difference for you, chances are that your are (or should 
be) in trouble anyway! It means that either you are 
unprepared operationally for the Euro or your strategy 
was grounded on a very weak basis. It is highly unlikely 
that the Euro only will really make you less (or more) 
competitive, and if it does, it probably means that your 
company is (relatively) un-competitive anyway, even 
without an Euro (or that you missed out on already 
previously emerging business opportunities). Grand new 
business opportunities are not likely to open up overnight. 
What one needs to do, in any event, is to constantly re-evaluate its industry and position 
in it. But the process of reflecting on and managing how you should compete in the 
changing European market and competitive environment should not be affected by the 
date of January 1 1999 or by January 1 of any other year! 
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